Hedge fund franchises by FUNG, William et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of










Singapore Management University, melvynteo@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons, and the Portfolio and Security
Analysis Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Lee Kong Chian School of Business at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business by an authorized administrator
of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
FUNG, William; HSIEH, David; NAIK, Narayan Y.; and TEO, Melvyn. Hedge fund franchises. (2017). 1-51. Research Collection Lee
Kong Chian School Of Business.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/lkcsb_research/5896
Hedge Fund Franchises
William Fung, David Hsieh, Narayan Naik, Melvyn Teo⇤
Abstract
We investigate the growth strategies of hedge fund firms. We find that firms with
successful first funds are able to launch follow-on funds that charge higher performance
fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and attract greater inflows. Motivated by
the aforementioned spillover e↵ects, first funds outperform follow-on funds, after ad-
justing for risk. The multiple-product growth strategy hurts investors while benefitting
hedge fund firms; multiple-product firms underperform single-product firms but harvest
greater fee revenues. Investors respond to this growth strategy by redeeming from first
funds of firms with follow-on funds that do poorly. Moreover, skilled investors allocate
more capital to first than to follow-on hedge funds. Empirically, the multiple-product
firm has become the dominant business model for the hedge fund industry.
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in Paris, the 2013 Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research (ABFER) Conference in Singapore, and
the 2013 European Finance Association Meetings in Cambridge UK. We are also grateful for the research
assistance of Kelvin Min, Yan Qiu, and Lin Sun. This is a substantially revised version of the paper entitled
“Growing the asset management franchise: evidence from hedge funds.”
1. Introduction
“The Board’s point of view is that at its essence the Man Group’s strategy is a growth
strategy. . . . And when we’re looking therefore at each aspect of our business, we have to be
able to grow it. We have to be able to scale it.”
– Kevin Hayes, Man Group 1
Hedge funds collectively managed over US$3 trillion in assets in 2016.2 Institutional
investors have grown to become the dominant investor clientele in this industry.3 Concomi-
tantly, increased regulatory and compliance costs, as well as a heightened pressure to lower
hedge fund fees, have ratcheted up the critical mass needed for a hedge fund firm to sustain
operations with management fee revenues.4 Therefore, it has become imperative for hedge
fund firms to grow in order to attract large institutional investors and to spread the higher
fixed costs over a larger asset base. While recent academic work has emphasized how the
incentives of hedge fund managers motivate asset growth (Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016;
Yin, 2016), the question remains: how do hedge fund firms grow?
Our paper fills this gap by focusing on the behaviour of hedge fund firms who have
managed to create a track record and who now face a choice of growth strategy. We start
with the observation that hedge fund firms often operate multiple funds, and not all funds
managed by a hedge fund firm command the same regard from investors. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the reputation of a multiple-fund firm rests heavily on the performance of its
1See Pozen and Clay (2012, p. 6).
2See https://www.barclayhedge.com/research/indices/ghs/mum/HF Money Under Management.html.
3See “Hedge funds must grapple with shifting balance of power,” Financial Times, 25 August 2015, for a
discussion on the institutionalization of the hedge fund industry.
4According to Troy Gayeski, partner at SkyBridge, a New York-based fund of funds, “Ten years ago a
hedge fund with $50m of assets could generate plenty of revenue to cover overheads. These days it has to
be $500m, and part of the reason is that regulatory requirements have gone up dramatically.” See “Hedge
funds move to family o ces is not entirely popular,” Financial Times, 23 October 2015. For a discussion on
fees see “Hedge funds cut fees to stem client exodus,” Financial Times, 18 December 2015, and “Calpers to
pare external managers,” Wall Street Journal, 8 June 2015.
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first fund.5 Having started her first fund, in order to grow her business, a hedge fund manager
faces two choices. She could (i) simply grow the assets under management (henceforth
AUM) of a single commingled fund or product, or (ii) o↵er multiple funds or products.
Which of these two options is the preferred one? Do hedge fund firms leverage o↵ the stellar
performance of their first funds to launch additional funds? Do the capital raising activities
of multiple-product firms benefit investors? How do such activities impact the total fee
revenue of the hedge fund firm? And how do investors respond to firms that launch multiple
products?
Our results are striking. We find that hedge fund firms with successful first funds launch
follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees, set more onerous redemption terms,
and attract greater inflows. These e↵ects prevail after controlling for the performance of
the other follow-on funds launched by the same firm. Indeed, past first fund performance
predicts future flows into follow-on funds over and above the explanatory power of their
respective track records. Thus, our empirical results suggest that there is a spillover e↵ect
from a successful first fund and it is an important consideration to hedge fund managers in
their capital raising campaigns.
In light of the positive spillover e↵ects engendered by first funds, are managers incen-
tivized to deliver better performance with the earlier funds launched by their firms? We find
that first funds outperform follow-on funds by 1.88 percent per annum after adjusting for co-
variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors and controlling for the other variables
that can explain fund performance. The e↵ect is statistically significant at the one percent
level. Moreover, the di↵erence between first and follow-on fund performance is even stronger
for the follow-on funds that are launched later. The abnormal return spread between the
first and the second to fifth funds launched is a statistically reliable but economically mod-
5For example, the Financial Times reported that Man Group’s stock rose buoyed by the outperformance
of its first fund, AHL. See “Man Group outperforms as first fund sparkles,” Financial Times, 24 September
2011. Similarly, the Wall Street Journal reported that BlueCrest plans to stop managing money for outside
clients after a run of poor returns and client redemptions from its first fund, BlueCrest Capital International.
See “BlueCrest capital decides to go private,” Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2015.
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est 1.79 percent, while the analogous spread between the first and the eleventh to twentieth
funds launched is an impressive 3.45 percent per year. These findings cannot be explained
by di↵erences in fund share restrictions and illiquidity (Aragon, 2007; Aragon and Strahan,
2012), fund fees (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009), age (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010), size
(Berk and Green, 2004), return smoothing behavior (Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov, 2004),
and backfill and incubation bias (Liang, 2000; Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst, 2014).
Hedge fund investors do not benefit from the capital raising activities of multiple-product
firms. Portfolio sorts indicate that multiple-product firms on average underperform single-
product firms by a statistically reliable 3.77 percent per annum after adjusting for risk. Yet,
despite underperforming single-product firms, multiple-product firms are able to generate
significantly greater total fee revenue than their single-product counterparts. In particular,
multiple-product firms harvest fee revenues that are on average US$21.68 million per annum
higher than that harvested by single-product firms. The larger size of the multiple-product
firms explains much of the di↵erence in fee revenue.6
Empirical evidence shows that the outperformance of the first fund is driven by strong
initial performance, which moderates after the launch of the first follow-on fund. Prior to
follow-on fund launches, first funds of multiple-product firms deliver a return of 10.83% per
year after adjusting for risk. However, upon the launch of the first follow-on fund, first
funds’ alpha deteriorates by 5.35% per annum. The reduction in performance is 1.92%
greater than that for comparable first funds at other firms. Instead of protecting the first
fund’s performance by limiting its AUM growth, multiple-product firms typically grow AUM
across all products, i.e., first as well as follow-on. This in part explains the performance
deterioration of multiple-product firms once they embark on an asset-gathering strategy.
Investors’ confidence in firms with successful first funds is not completely misplaced.
Stellar first fund performance is associated with better subsequent follow-on fund and first
6In the paper, we principally label as multiple-product firms, those with multiple funds. That said, our
results prevail when we define as multiple-product firms, those with multiple distinct strategies. Specifically,
firms with uncorrelated strategies underperform those with one strategy (or correlated strategies), but harvest
greater fee revenues.
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fund performance. We find that on average, a one percentage point increase in the first
fund’s monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to the launch of the first follow-on fund
precipitates a 13.6 basis point increase in follow-on fund monthly alpha, and a 12.6 basis
point increase in the first fund monthly alpha, in the 12-month post launch period. Therefore,
it seems that investors who subscribe to a new fund launched by a hedge fund firm with
a stellar first fund are responding rationally to the positive outlook that such an event is
signaling at the beginning of the firm’s capital raising campaign.
Just as stellar performance of the first fund can help capital raising for the firm, poor
performance of follow-on funds can be detrimental to this process. We find evidence of
a significant blowback e↵ect from follow-on funds to the first fund. Lower follow-on fund
returns over the past one and two years are associated with lower flows into the first fund of
the same hedge fund firm after controlling for past first fund returns. This blowback e↵ect
suggests that firms need to balance quantity with quality when embarking on such a growth
path.
Finally, skilled investors appear cognizant of the implications of this growth strategy.
We show that, consistent with the view that some hedge fund investors possess investment
skill, funds of hedge funds (henceforth FoFs) with high past alpha t-statistics subsequently
outperform FoFs with low past alpha t-statistics.7 Relative to the unskilled investors (i.e.,
the bottom decile of FoFs based on past alpha t-statistics), skilled investors (i.e., the top
decile of FoFs based on past alpha t-statistics) load more on the first funds than on the
follow-on funds launched by hedge fund firms.
The results in this paper resonate with two strands of research on hedge funds. The first
strand sheds light on hedge fund alpha and finds that incentivized (Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik, 2009), geographically proximate (Teo, 2009), emerging (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010),
and distinctive (Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012) hedge funds deliver higher alpha. We show
that hedge funds that are conceived earlier by their firms also outperform.8 The second strand
7This is analogous to a sort on fund information ratio.
8Unlike Aggarwal and Jorion (2010) who analyze the impact of time since fund launch on performance,
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examines agency problems and finds that some hedge funds strategically delay reporting poor
performance (Aragon and Nanda, 2017), inflate their December returns (Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik, 2011), and take on excessive liquidity risk (Teo, 2011).9 We find that consistent
with the agency view, better incentive alignment via manager co-investment helps ameliorate
the tendency of hedge fund firms to launch follow-on funds that underperform first funds.
This paper echoes research on the strategic behavior of mutual fund families (Massa,
2003; Nanda, Wang, and Zheng, 2004; Gaspar, Massa, and Matos, 2006; Sialm and Tham,
2016). While Massa (2003) investigates the relationship between the performance of a mutual
fund family in a category and the degree of product di↵erentiation in the category, we study
the link between the performance of a hedge fund firm and the degree of fund or strategy
proliferation in the firm itself. Unlike Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), who document
positive spillover e↵ects in the form of greater flows to the other mutual funds of families
with stars, we show that for hedge funds intra-firm spillover e↵ects extend beyond flows to
include fees, redemption terms, and performance.
Our work complements Kolokolova (2011) and Yin (2016). Kolokolova (2011) finds that
hedge fund firms with high past returns are more likely to launch new funds and attract
inflows. She does not di↵erentiate between first and follow-on funds. We believe that focus-
ing on first funds is critical as stellar first fund performance allows a firm to transition from
a single-product to a multiple-product firm. Yin (2016) argues that the hedge fund man-
agement compensation contract induces individual hedge funds to grow beyond that which
is optimal for fund performance. While Yin (2016) focuses on the growth of the individual
hedge fund, we focus on the growth of the hedge fund firm.
Relative to Kolokolova (2011) and Yin (2016), we deepen our understanding of firm
strategic behavior by (i) documenting intra-firm spillover e↵ects from first funds to follow-
on funds and vice-versa (i.e., the blowback flow e↵ect), (ii) uncovering the relationship
we investigate the association between the launch order of funds within firms and performance.
9Jorion and Schwarz (2014) argue that the discontinuity at zero in the hedge fund net return distribution
documented by Bollen and Pool (2009) is not evidence of manager manipulation.
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between fund launch order and performance, (iii) exploring intra-firm fund performance
persistence, (iv) testing the impact of firm strategy diversification on fund performance, and
(v) understanding the preference by hedge fund investors for first versus follow-on funds. By
finding evidence of intra-firm performance persistence, we resolve the conundrum raised by
Kolokolova (2011) about the apparent irrationality of fund investors that respond to short-
lived firm performance. Our results suggest that stellar first fund performance not only
allows first funds to grow capital beyond the optimal point, as in Yin (2016), but also allows
their management company to do likewise via the launch of follow-on funds. Consequently,
the indirect incentives facing hedge fund managers, especially those managing first funds,
are likely to be even stronger those that suggested by Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2016).
We note that the endogeneity of firm growth strategy does not explain the underperfor-
mance of hedge funds launched later by firms. The multivariate regression methodology that
we employ allows us to sidestep concerns that observed di↵erences between funds managed
by single- and multiple-product firms explain our results. To cater for unobserved di↵er-
ences between single- and multiple-product firms, we run an instrumental variables analysis
with the supply of investment capital at firm founding as the instrument. We find that first
funds outperform follow-on funds even more after instrumenting for firm growth strategy.
Similarly, the more general result that the later funds launched by firms underperform the
earlier funds prevails after instrumenting for firm multiple-product status. Our choice of
instrument follows Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) and is robust to alternative
specifications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
methodology. Section 3 reports the results from the empirical analysis while Section 4
presents a series of robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Data and methodology
We evaluate hedge funds using monthly net returns and AUM data of live and dead hedge
funds reported in the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge datasets from January 1990 to Decem-
ber 2013.10 Because TASS, HFR and BarclayHedge started distributing their data in 1994,
the data sets do not contain information on funds that died before December 1993. This
gives rise to survivorship bias. We mitigate this bias by focusing on data from January 1994
onward.
In our fund universe, we have a total of 16,828 hedge funds, of which 5,633 are live funds
and 11,195 are dead funds. The funds are roughly evenly split between the three databases.
While 1,704 funds appear in all three databases and 3,256 funds appear in two databases,
many funds belong to only one database. Specifically, there are 3,729 funds, 3,735 funds,
and 4,404 funds peculiar to the TASS, HFR, and BarclayHedge databases, respectively. This
highlights the advantage of obtaining data from multiple sources. In our analysis, we focus
on the sample of funds without duplicate share classes due to concerns that funds with
multiple share classes could cloud the analysis.11 Removing duplicate share classes from the
sample leaves us with a total of 15,607 hedge funds, of which 5,269 are live funds and 10,338
are dead funds.
We define first funds as the first fund launched by each hedge fund firm. Follow-on funds
are the other funds launched by hedge fund firms. To determine fund status, we sort our
sample of funds based on fund inception date within the firm. To ensure that there is only
one first fund per firm, when more than one fund is launched in the same month by a firm,
we merge them to form a composite fund and treat it as that firm’s first fund.12 The fund
10The results are robust to using pre-fee returns.
11If a hedge fund firm has an onshore and o↵shore fund pair, we drop the o↵shore fund, essentially treating
it like a duplicate share class. We also find that our baseline results do not change if we drop the onshore
fund in those cases. Our findings are therefore not driven by di↵erences between the onshore and o↵shore
duplicate of the same fund (Aragon, Liang, and Park, 2014).
12Of the 6,882 firms in our sample, 6,387 have a single first component fund while only 495 have multiple
first component funds. In other words, 93 percent of the firms in our sample started with only one fund. The
average number of first component funds per firm is 1.087. In lieu of forming composite first funds, we cater
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attributes and monthly returns of the composite fund are simply the average fund attribute
and average monthly returns of its component funds, respectively. The monthly AUM of the
composite fund is the sum of the monthly AUM of its component funds.
Following Joenva¨a¨ra¨, Kosowski, and Tolonen (2017), we classify hedge funds into 12
investment styles: Commodity Trading Advisor, Emerging Markets, Event Driven, Global
Macro, Long Only, Equity Long/Short, Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value,
Sector, Short Bias, and Others. Table 1 breaks down the funds in the sample by investment
strategy and reports the first and follow-on fund distribution as well as the number of live
and dead funds in each strategy. To facilitate comparison with our overall fund sample, the
first funds reported in Table 1 include all the component first funds launched by hedge fund
firms. So, there are more first funds reported in Table 1 than there are firms. We note that
there are 6,882 firms in our sample. When the component funds are grouped together to
form composite funds so that each firm is linked to only one first fund, we find that there
are 4,618 firms with only one fund, 1,921 firms with two to five funds, 232 firms with six to
ten funds, 85 firms with 11 to 20 funds, and 26 firms with more than 20 funds. We note
that the time between successive fund launches is a decreasing function of the number of
funds already launched by the firm. For example, after conceiving its first fund, a firm takes
about 38 months on average to launch the second fund, another 28 months to launch the
third fund, and another 22 months to launch the fourth fund.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Hedge fund data are susceptible to many biases (Liang, 2000; Fung and Hsieh, 2009).
These biases stem from the fact that inclusion in hedge fund databases is voluntary. As a
result, there is a self-selection bias. For instance, funds often undergo an incubation period in
which they rely on internal funding before seeking capital from outside investors. Incubated
for the possibility that firms may launch more than one fund in their first month in two alternative ways.
First, we drop firms that have more than one first fund, i.e., firms that launched more than one fund during
their first month. Second, for such firms, we consider the largest fund launched during the first month as the
first fund (based on fund AUM for the launch month) and remove the other smaller fund or funds conceived
during that month. Our baseline results remain qualitatively unchanged with these adjustments.
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funds with successful track records then go on to list in various hedge fund databases while
the unsuccessful funds do not, resulting in an incubation bias. Related to this, when a
fund is listed on a database, it often includes data prior to the listing date. Again, because
successful funds have a strong incentive to list and attract capital inflows, these backfilled
returns tend to be higher than the non-backfilled returns. In the analysis that follows, we
will repeat the tests after dropping the first 24 months of return data from each fund to
ensure that the results are robust to backfill and incubation bias. To fully address concerns
about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we also
redo the tests after removing all return observations that have been backfilled prior to fund
listing date.
Throughout this paper, we model the risks of hedge funds using the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung and Hsieh factors are the excess return on the Standard and
Poor’s (S&P) 500 index (SNPMRF); a small minus big factor (SCMLC) constructed as the
di↵erence between the Wilshire small and large capitalization stock indices; the yield spread
of the US ten-year Treasury bond over the three-month Treasury bill, adjusted for duration
of the ten-year bond (BD10RET); the change in the credit spread of Moody’s BAA bond
over the ten-year Treasury bond, also appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY);
and the excess returns on portfolios of look back straddle options on currencies (PTFSFX),
commodities (PTFSCOM), and bonds (PTFSBD), which are constructed to replicate the
maximum possible return from trend following strategies (see Fung and Hsieh, 2001) on
their respective underlying assets.13 These seven factors have been shown by Fung and
Hsieh (2004) to have considerable explanatory power on hedge fund returns.




3.1 Spillover e↵ects within hedge fund firms
Our first set of tests focuses on spillover e↵ects within hedge fund firms. We ask, how does
stellar first fund performance benefit the follow-on funds managed by the same firm? We
explore these spillover e↵ects by testing the relationship between the past performance of
the first fund and the fund attributes of as well as flows into follow-on funds. Specifically,
we estimate the following OLS regressions:







eyY EARDUMyi + ✏i, (1)








f yY EARDUMym + ✏im, (2)
where in Eq. (1), FIRSTALPHAi and NFIRSTALPHAi are the first and other follow-on
fund monthly alpha averaged over the last 12 months prior to the launch of fund i, respec-
tively, FUNDATTRIBUTEi is either follow-on fund management fee, performance fee,
redemption period, or notice period, STY LEDUMki is follow-on fund style dummy for style
k, and Y EARDUMyi is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y. Fund alpha is fund
monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven factors. Alpha is estimated for all funds with at least 24 months of return information.14
We assume that the fund attributes reported in the commercial databases are determined at
14The results remain qualitatively unchanged when alpha is estimated for all funds with at least 36 months
of return data.
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fund launch. In Eq. (2), FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 and NFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 are the
first and other follow-on fund monthly alpha averaged over the last 12 months, respectively,
FUNDALPHAim 12,m 1 is own fund monthly alpha averaged over the last 12 months, and
FUNDFLOWim is own fund monthly net inflow. We also estimate variants of the Eq. (1)
and (2) regressions where the independent variables are monthly alphas averaged over the
last 24 or 36 months.15 Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered at the fund level.
The results reported in Panels A to C of Table 2 indicate that stellar first fund perfor-
mance confers a variety of benefits to the follow-on funds managed by the same firm. The
coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in the fund attribute regressions suggest that con-
trolling for the performance of the other funds within the same firm, firms with stellar first
funds are able to raise follow-on funds that charge higher performance fees as well as set
longer redemption and notification periods. The impact of past first fund performance on
follow-on fund performance fee and on notice period is statistically significant at the one or
five percent level regardless of whether we average first fund alpha over the 12-, 24-, or 36-
month period prior to the launch of the follow-on fund. That on follow-on fund redemption
period is statistically significant at the one percent level when we average first fund alpha
over the 24- or 36-month period prior to follow-on fund launch. The results are economi-
cally meaningful. For example, the coe cient estimate on the first fund alpha in the notice
period regression with monthly alpha averaged over the last 24 months indicates that a one
standard deviation (or 1.44 percentage point) improvement in monthly alpha increases the
notice period by 2.59 business days. This represents a 12.95% increase relative to a baseline
notice period of a month, i.e., 20 business days.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Excellent first fund performance also allows hedge fund firms to raise more capital for their
follow-on funds. The coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA in the fund flow regressions
15Inferences do not change when we estimate regressions on raw fund returns instead of alphas.
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indicate that controlling for own fund past alpha and the past performance of other follow-
on funds within the same family, flows into follow-on funds are positively associated with
the past performance of the first fund within the same family. The impact of first fund
performance on follow-on fund flow is positive and statistically significant at the one or five
percent level for alpha averaged over the past 12, 24, and 36 months. Specifically, a one
standard deviation (or 1.44 percentage point) improvement in monthly alpha over the past
24 months is associated with a 0.29% increase in inflows into follow-on funds the next month.
We note that the impact of first fund performance on follow-on fund flow is about 22.35%
as large as the impact of own follow-on fund performance on follow-on fund flow, at least
based on performance averaged over the past 24 months. Collectively, these results indicate
that hedge fund firms are incentivized to deliver stellar performance with their first funds so
as to raise follow-on funds on favorable terms.
3.2 Tests of hedge fund performance
To test whether the incentives to generate superior performance with first funds impact
performance, we evaluate the performance of first funds relative to the performance of follow-
on funds. Every month, we sort funds within each hedge fund firm into 20 portfolios based
on fund inception date. The nth portfolio corresponds to the nth fund launched by the firm.
The first portfolio is simply the first fund portfolio. The other portfolios are the follow-
on fund portfolios sorted by launch date within the firm. Next, we average the returns of
each fund inception portfolio across hedge fund firms and evaluate the performance of the
1st fund (portfolio A), the 2nd to 5th funds launched (portfolio B), the 6th to 10th funds
launched (portfolio C), and the 11th to 20th funds launched (portfolio D) relative to the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Portfolio B is simply the average of the 2nd to
5th fund inception portfolios. The other follow-on fund portfolios are defined analogously.
Since there are relatively few firms that launch ten or more funds, the average number of
funds in these portfolios decreases as we go from portfolio A to portfolio D. On average,
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portfolio A comprises 2,238 funds, portfolio B covers 348 funds, portfolio C encompasses 67
funds, and portfolio D contains 18 funds. Statistical inferences are based on White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
The results from the fund inception date sort, reported in Panel A of Table 3, indicate
that first funds outperform follow-on funds. Portfolio A delivers an average return of 5.28%
per annum after adjusting for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, while
portfolio B delivers an average risk-adjusted return of 3.49%. The risk-adjusted spread
between these two portfolios is statistically significant at the one percent level (t-statistic =
5.68) but economically modest at 1.79% per annum after adjusting for risk. The abnormal
spread rises to a more impressive 3.45% per annum when we move from portfolio B to
portfolio D. These results suggest that the later funds launched by a hedge fund firm tend
to underperform the earlier funds launched by the same firm.
Since small hedge funds may not be relevant to large institutional investors, we also
conduct the portfolio sort on the sample of hedge funds with at least US$20m of AUM.
The results reported in Panel B of Table 3 indicate that our findings are not driven by the
smallest funds in the sample. Given capacity constraints at the fund level, the annualized
alphas of the portfolios shrink by on average 1.83% when we exclude the smaller funds from
the analysis. Nonetheless, the spread between portfolios A and D remains economically and
statistically significant at 4.07% per annum (t-statistic = 4.46).
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 1 here]
Figure 1 complements the results from Panel A of Table 3. It illustrates the monthly
cumulative abnormal returns (henceforth CARs) from the portfolio of first funds (portfolio
A) and the portfolios of follow-on funds (portfolios B, C, and D). CAR is the cumulative
di↵erence between a portfolio’s excess return and its factor loadings (estimated over the
entire sample period) multiplied by the Fung and Hsieh (2004) risk factors. The CARs in
Figure 1 indicate that portfolio A consistently outperforms portfolios B, C, and D over the
entire sample period.
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There are concerns that first funds may outperform follow-on funds because the former
funds manage fewer assets and therefore are less a↵ected by capacity constraints (Berk and
Green, 2004). To allay such concerns, we estimate the following pooled OLS regression:
ALPHAim = a+ bFIRSTi + clog(SIZEim 1) + dMGTFEEi + ePERFFEEi







lyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (3)
where ALPHA is fund monthly abnormal return after stripping away co-variation with the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, FIRST is an indicator variable that takes a value
of one when a fund is a first fund and a value of zero otherwise, SIZE is fund monthly
AUM in millions of US$, MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage, PERFFEE
is fund performance fee in percentage, NOTICE is fund redemption notification period in
months, AGE is fund age in decades, STY LEDUM is fund style dummy, and Y EARDUM
is year dummy. The primary variable of interest is FIRST . The coe cient estimate on it
provides an indication of the spread in risk-adjusted performance between first and follow-on
funds. To facilitate the estimation of fund alpha, we only include results for funds with at
least 24 months of return data. We also estimate the analogous regression on raw monthly
fund returns to ensure that our findings are not artifacts of the risk adjustment methodology.
Statistical inferences are based on White (1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
clustered at the fund level.
[Insert Table 4 here]
The results from the cross-sectional regression analysis are reported in columns one and
two of Table 4. They corroborate the findings of the portfolio sorts and indicate that first
funds outperform follow-on funds. Specifically, the coe cient estimate on FIRST in the
alpha regression reported in column two of Table 4 reveals that, controlling for other factors
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that could explain fund performance, first funds outperform follow-on funds by 1.88% per
annum after adjusting for risk. The coe cient estimates on the other control variables accord
with the extant literature. High-powered incentives or fees (Agarwal, Daniel and Naik,
2009) and longer redemption notice periods (Aragon, 2007) are associated with superior
performance while fund age is linked to poorer performance (Aggarwal and Jorion, 2010).
Inferences do not change when we estimate the regression on raw returns suggesting that
our findings are not driven by our risk adjustment technology.
To check for robustness, we estimate Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in place of
the OLS regressions. Specifically, first we run cross-sectional regressions for each month.
Then, we report the time-series averages of the coe cient estimates, and use the time-
series standard errors of the average slopes to draw inferences. The Fama and MacBeth
regressions control for correlation in residuals across di↵erent funds within the same month.
We compute the standard errors using the method of Newey and West (1987) with a three-
month lag to adjust for dependence across time. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) results
reported in columns three and four of Table 4 echo our previous findings and indicate that
they are robust to alternative model specifications.
The portfolio sorts in Table 3 not only suggest that first funds outperform follow-on funds
but also allude to the more general finding that the earlier funds launched tend to outperform
the later funds launched by the same firm. To test the impact of fund chronology in a
regression setting, we re-estimate the Eq. (3) regressions with CHRONO in place of FIRST ,
where CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. The results reported in columns
five to eight of Table 4 indicate that controlling for the other factors that influence fund
performance, funds that are launched earlier outperform funds that are launched later within
each firm. The results are economically and statistically significant. The OLS coe cient
estimate on CHRONO in column six of Table 4 reveals that a one standard deviation
increase in fund launch order, i.e., by 6.90 funds, is associated with a 1.16 percent per
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annum reduction in fund alpha.16
To test whether the underperformance of follow-on funds is driven by agency problems at
hedge funds, we compare the performance di↵erential between first and follow-on funds for
groups of hedge funds sorted by incentive alignment. One way to align incentives is for the
manager to co-invest personal capital alongside her limited partners. Hence, we sort funds
into those with personal capital and those without personal capital. This is only possible for
TASS funds since only TASS provides information on personal capital. Next, we re-estimate
the Eq. (3) regressions for these two groups of hedge funds. The results reported in Table A1
of the Internet Appendix indicate that consistent with the agency view, the outperformance
of first funds is largely driven by funds with poor incentive alignment, i.e., those with no
personal capital.17
3.3 Tests of hedge fund firm performance
Do investors benefit when hedge fund firms deliver superior performance with their first funds
and subsequently raise capital via follow-on funds? It is not clear whether the superior
performance of the first fund more than compensates for the inferior performance of the
follow-on funds launched by a hedge fund firm. To investigate, every month, we sort firms
into five portfolios based on the number of funds previously launched. The first portfolio
consists of firms that have launched only one fund. The other firms are sorted equally into
the other four portfolios. The post-formation returns on these five portfolios during the next
month are linked across months to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then
16We also estimate the same set of regressions as in Table 4 but with both FIRST and CHRONO as
independent variables, together with the same set of controls. The results are largely robust to the inclusion
of both independent variables in the regression. The coe cient estimates on FIRST are positive and
statistically significant at the one percent level across all regressions specifications. Those on CHRONO
are all negative and statistically significant at the one percent level, save for that in the Fama-MacBeth
regression on fund returns, which it is negative and statistically significant at the ten percent level. These
results are available upon request and suggest that successive fund performance continues to deteriorate even
after the launch of the first follow-on fund.
17The Fama-MacBeth regressions for the subsets of funds with and without personal capital reported in
Table A1 do not feature strategy fixed e↵ects as, within each group, there exist months where there are no
funds in some strategies.
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evaluate the performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The
alpha of the spread between portfolio 1 (firms with one fund) and portfolio 5 (firms with
many funds) represents the dispersion in risk-adjusted returns across firms as a result of the
variation in number of funds per firm launched. To calculate hedge fund firm returns, we
weight all the funds with return observations within each firm by fund AUM.
The results from the hedge fund firm sort are reported in Panel A of Table 5. They
indicate that the practice of generating superior first fund performance and raising capital via
follow-on funds does not benefit fund investors. Firms managing many funds underperform
firms managing one fund by 3.74% per annum. After adjusting for co-variation with the
Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, this spread rises marginally to 3.77% per annum. Both the
raw return and risk-adjusted return spreads are statistically significant at the one percent
level. In addition, the excess returns decrease monotonically as we move from portfolio 1 to
portfolio 5. In Panel B of Table 5, we report the results when we equal-weight fund returns
to obtain firm returns. They indicate that our findings are robust to varying the way we
compute firm returns.18
The results in Panels A and B of Table 5 are consistent with the asset gathering view
where hedge fund firms with successful first funds take advantage of their stellar track records
and raise follow-on funds that subsequently underperform. The asset gathering view further
predicts that in order to grow capital aggressively, firms will o↵er funds in multiple divergent
investment strategies to cater to an investor preference for diversification (Massa, 2003). To
test this view, every month, we sort firms into five portfolios based on the average pairwise
correlation of the strategies of the funds managed by the firm. To maximize the precision
of the correlation estimate, pairwise strategy correlation is estimated over the entire sample
period for each strategy pair. The first portfolio consists of firms that have launched only
funds in one strategy. The other firms are sorted equally into the other four portfolios.
18Inferences do not change when we adjust for backfill and incubation bias by removing the first 24 months
of returns for each fund or when we adjust for backfill bias by confining the sample to hedge fund returns
reported at or after fund listing date.
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The post-formation returns on these five portfolios during the next month are linked across
months to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate the performance of
the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. The alpha of the spread between
portfolio I (firms with one strategy) and portfolio V (firms with uncorrelated strategies)
represents the dispersion in risk-adjusted returns across firms as a result of the variation in
intra-firm strategy correlation. The advantage of sorting on strategy divergence as opposed
to the number of strategies within each firm is that we avoid commingling firms that engage
in multiple but similar investment strategies with firms that pursue multiple and divergent
investment strategies. The latter is more consonant with a growth-oriented asset gathering
strategy that caters to an investor preference for diversification.
The results reported in Panels C and D of Table 5 indicate that firms managing divergent
strategies underperform firms managing correlated strategies. When we value-weight fund
returns to obtain firm returns, the underperformance is 4.21% per annum. After adjusting
for co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) factors, this spread falls marginally to 3.70%
per annum. Both the raw and risk-adjusted return spreads are statistically significant at the
one percent level. Inferences do not change when we equal-weight fund returns to obtain
firm returns.
[Insert Tables 5 and 6 here]
To address concerns that the firm sort results may be driven by other factors that drive
fund performance, we estimate the Eq. (3) OLS and Fama-MacBeth regressions with the
independent variables NFUNDS or STRATCORR in addition to FIRST.19 The variable
NFUNDS is the number of funds launched by the hedge fund firm while STRATCORR
is the average pairwise correlation of the strategies engaged by the firm. The multivariate
regression results reported in Table 6 corroborate the findings from the portfolio sorts in Table
5. The coe cient estimates on NFUNDS are negative and statistically significant at the one
or five percent level for all regression specifications, while those on STRATCORR are positive
19Inferences do not change when we exclude FIRST as an independent variable in these regressions.
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and statistically significant at the one percent level across all regression specifications. These
findings dovetail with the asset gathering view.
3.4 Tests of hedge fund firm revenue
How does raising multiple funds a↵ect the total fee revenue that accrues to the firm man-
agement company? To investigate, we sort firms into five portfolios based on the number of
funds launched as in Panel A of Table 5. Next, we evaluate the total firm fee revenue (man-
agement fee plus performance fee) over the subsequent one-year period. Fund performance
fee is calculated based on the assumptions outlined in Appendix A of Agarwal, Daniel, and
Naik (2009) and after accounting for the high water mark feature in hedge fund incentive
fee contracts.
We find that hedge fund management companies benefit significantly from launching
multiple funds or products. On average, the multiple-product firms in portfolio 5 (firms with
many funds) harvest an annual fee revenue of US$25.50 million, which is US$21.68 million
greater than that harvested by the average single-product firm in portfolio 1 (firms with one
fund). The di↵erence in fee revenues is statistically significant at the one percent level. The
greater AUM of the multiple-product firms drives much of the fee revenue di↵erence. On
average, firms in portfolio 5 manage US$866.44 million, while firms in portfolio 1 manage
only US$95.37 million.20
These results suggest that hedge fund firms (not investors) benefit from the multiple-
product growth strategy. Unsurprisingly, we find that this has become the dominant business
model for hedge fund firms. At the start of our sample period, multiple-product firms manage
47.14% of funds (by number) and 62.56% of industry assets. By the end of the sample period,
multiple-product firms manage 68.94% of funds (by number) and 77.19% of industry assets.
20We obtain similar inferences when we sort based on the average pairwise correlation of the strategies of
the funds managed by the firm. Multiple-product firms in portfolio V (firms with uncorrelated strategies)
harvest average annual fee revenues of US$14.11 million, which is US$8.54 million greater than that harvested
by the average single-product firm in portfolio I (firms with correlated strategies). The di↵erence in fee
revenues is statistically significant at the one percent level. Firms in portfolio V manage US$467.96 million
while firms in portfolio I manage US$143.36 million.
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3.5 Event study
Do firms protect the performance of their first funds while simultaneously operating other
follow-on funds? To investigate, we first plot the monthly abnormal returns of the average
first fund 36 months before to 36 months after the launch of the first follow-on fund by the
same firm. To accommodate the 36-month window, the fund sample we analyze only includes
first funds whose firms raised a subsequent fund between January 1997 and December 2010,
and that report returns in the 24-month period before and in the 24-month period after the
launch of the follow-on fund.
The resultant graph in Figure 2 suggests that first fund performance deteriorates once
the firm launches a subsequent fund. The average annual first fund risk-adjusted return
prior to the follow-on fund launch is 10.83%, while the analogous return after the follow-
on fund launch is 5.48%. This implies that first fund performance deteriorates by 5.35%
once the firm launches another fund. In Figure 2, we also plot the AUM of the average
first fund over the same event window. We find that despite the deterioration in first fund
performance, the average first fund is able to increase its AUM by 51% from US$193m to
US$292m in the 36-month period after the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same
firm. This represents a substantial increase in AUM on the back of a 72% growth in AUM
from US$112m to US$193m over the 36-month period prior to the launch. The first fund
returns and AUM depicted in Figure 2 suggest that following a bout of stellar performance
at their first funds, hedge fund firms aggressively raise capital by launching new funds and
marketing the first funds to investors. The resultant increase in AUM at the first funds may
explain, at least in part, their subsequent underperformance.
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 7 here]
To account for endogeneity concerns driven by observable di↵erences between firms that
launch follow-on funds and firms that do not, we match event hedge funds with non-event
hedge funds based on fund performance and AUM in the 24-month pre-launch period and
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conduct a di↵erence-in-di↵erences analysis. For example, in the fund abnormal return or
alpha analysis, event funds are matched to non-event funds by minimizing the sum of the
absolute di↵erences in monthly fund abnormal return in the 24-month pre-launch period.
Table 7 reports di↵erences in fund return, alpha, and AUM before and after the launch of the
first follow-on fund relative to the matched sample. The results reported in Table 7 indicate
that relative to the matched sample, first fund annualized return and alpha fall by 1.92%
after the launch of the first follow-on fund. At the same time, relative to comparable funds,
first fund AUM (averaged over 36 months) increases by US$26.21m in post-event period
relative to that in the pre-event period.
To test whether the outperformance of first funds is confined to the period prior to
the launch of the first follow-on fund, we estimate OLS regressions on monthly fund alpha
analogous to that in Eq. (3) but with FIRST PRELAUNCH as an additional independent
variable. The indicator variable FIRST PRELAUNCH takes a value of one if the fund
is the first fund managed by a firm and the firm will but has yet to launch another fund,
and a value of zero, otherwise. In results that are available upon request, we find that the
outperformance of the first fund is not confined to the period prior to the launch of the
subsequent fund by the same firm. The coe cient estimate on FIRST PRELAUNCH is
positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. It suggests that after adjusting
for other factors that explain fund performance, first fund abnormal returns decrease by
1.86% per year after the launch of follow-on funds.21 The coe cient estimate on FIRST is
also positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. It indicates that first funds
continue to outperform follow-on funds by 1.25% per year on a risk-adjusted basis even after
the launch of the first follow-on fund by the same firm.
21We believe there are two possible explanations for the drop in first fund performance. First, partners
at firms that launch follow-on funds may be busy managing those follow-on funds and cannot devote as
much of their time to driving the investment process at the first fund. Second, firm partners may be less
incentivized to deliver superior performance with the first fund now that they have raised enough capital to
achieve critical mass at the firm level.
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3.6 Intra-firm performance spillovers
Are firms with first funds that delivered stellar performance skilled or simply lucky? One
view is that these firms are simply growing capital opportunistically in the wake of a lucky
run at the first fund. However, that view necessarily calls into question the rationality of
hedge fund investors who subscribe to the first and follow-on funds launched by such firms.
To investigate, we test the relationship between first fund performance prior to the launch
of the first follow-on fund and the performance of the follow-on fund post inception. Specif-
ically, we estimate the following regression on follow-on fund performance:
NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11 = a+ bFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + clog(NFIRSTSIZEim)








hyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (4)
where m is the follow-on fund inception month, NFIRSTALPHAim,m+11 is
follow-on fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-month post-inception pe-
riod, FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 is first fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-
month pre-inception period, NFIRSTSIZEim is follow-on fund size in US$m at
fund inception, NFIRSTMGTFEEi is follow-on fund management fee in per-
centage, NFIRSTPERFFEEi is follow-on fund performance fee in percentage,
NFIRSTNOTICEi is follow-on fund redemption notification period in months,
NFIRSTSTY LEDUMki is follow-on fund style dummy for style k, and Y EARDUM
y
m
is follow-on fund inception year dummy for year y. We estimate the univariate version of the
regression as well as two other versions where fund abnormal returns are averaged over 24
and 36 months instead of over 12 months. Statistical inferences are based on White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
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The coe cient estimates reported in columns one to six of Table 8 suggest that fund
risk-adjusted performance persists within hedge fund firms. A one percentage point increase
in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to the launch of the first follow-on
fund is associated with a 13.6 basis point increase in follow-on fund monthly alpha in the
12-month post launch period that is statistically significant at the one percent level. After
controlling for other variables that can explain follow-on fund performance, the coe cient
estimate on first fund alpha decreases by about a third but is still statistically significant
at the one percent level. We obtain similar results when investigating alpha or abnormal
returns averaged over 24 months. When abnormal returns are averaged over 36 months, the
coe cient estimates on FIRSTALPHA are significantly weaker and not always statistically
distinguishable from zero at the five percent level.
[Insert Table 8 here]
To investigate persistence in first fund performance, we estimate the following regression:
FIRSTALPHAim,m+11 = a+ bFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 + clog(FIRSTSIZEim 1)








hyY EARDUMym + ✏im, (5)
where m is the follow-on fund inception month, FIRSTALPHAim,m+11 is first fund abnor-
mal return averaged over the 12-month post-inception period, FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1
is first fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-month pre-inception period,
FIRSTSIZEim 1 is first fund size in US$m, FIRSTMGTFEEi is first fund man-
agement fee in percentage, FIRSTPERFFEEi is first fund performance fee in per-
centage, FIRSTNOTICEi is first fund redemption notification period in months,




fund inception year dummy for year y. We estimate the univariate version of the regression
as well as two other versions where fund abnormal returns are averaged over 24 and 36
months instead of over 12 months.
The coe cient estimates reported in columns seven to 12 of Table 8 indicate that first
fund performance persists around the launch of the first follow-on fund. A one percentage
point increase in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-month period prior to follow-on fund
launch is associated with a 12.6 basis point increase in first fund monthly alpha in the 12-
month period post follow-on fund launch. The coe cient estimate is statistically significant
at the one percent level, and prevails after controlling for the other factors that explain first
fund performance. In addition, the findings are robust to extending the evaluation horizon
to 24 or 36 months. Therefore, firms with stellar first fund performance are not simply lucky.
Investors who subscribe to the first and follow-on funds managed by such firms are rationally
responding to the view that they employ talented investment professionals.
3.7 Blowback e↵ect
Are there constraints on the amount of capital that hedge fund firms can raise when adopting
a multiple-product growth strategy? We test for evidence of a feedback or blowback e↵ect
from follow-on funds to first funds by estimating the following regression on first fund flow:
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where FIRSTFLOWim is flow into first fund i on month m, FIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1
is first fund i abnormal return averaged over the 12-month period prior to month m,
NFIRSTALPHAim 12,m 1 is follow-on fund abnormal return averaged over the 12-month
period prior to month m and averaged over all follow-on funds managed by the firm
that launched fund i, FIRSTSTY LEDUMki is first fund i style dummy for style k, and
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Y EARDUMym is year dummy for year y. Statistical inferences are based on White (1980)
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered at the firm level.
The results reported in Table 9 indicate that there is a significant blowback e↵ect from
follow-on funds to first funds. Poor follow-on past performance is a reliable harbinger of
lower flows into first funds. The impact of follow-on fund alpha is statistically significant
at the one percent level when returns are averaged over the last 12 or 24 months, even
after controlling for own fund past alpha. Moreover, the impact of follow-on fund alpha is
economically significant. Panel A of Table 9 indicates that for alpha evaluated over the last
12 months, it is about 17.54% as large as the impact of first fund alpha on first fund flow.
These results suggest that investors rationally impose constraints on the ability of hedge
fund firms to grow via the launch of multiple products. Firms that embark on this strategy
will need to balance quantity with quality when launching new funds.
[Insert Table 9 here]
3.8 Hedge fund investor preferences
Do investors understand the incentive di↵erences that hedge fund firms face when it comes
to first versus follow-on funds? To explore this question, it is helpful to have access to
information on investor holdings. However, information on investor holdings of hedge funds
is rarely available in practice.22 To circumvent the data availability issue, we exploit return
data on fund of hedge funds (henceforth FoFs).
First, we sort our sample of FoF managers into deciles based on past two-year alpha
t-statistics.23 The post-formation returns on these ten portfolios over the next 12 months
are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio. We then evaluate
22An exception is Aiken, Cli↵ord, and Ellis (2015) who examine the hedge fund holdings of registered
FoFs. However, they are only able to examine 79 FoFs due to the small number of registered FoFs.
23We sort based on t-statistic of fund alpha as opposed to fund alpha as Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2004)
show using bootstrap estimates that the performance of top hedge funds ranked by t-statistic of fund alpha
(which is similar to sorting by the information ratio often used to rank fund managers) cannot be attributed
to sample variation or luck.
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the performance of the portfolios relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. We find that
FoFs with high past alpha t-statistics subsequently outperform FoFs with low past alpha
t-statistics. Specifically, the alpha of the spread between the top and bottom deciles of FoFs
sorted on past two-year alpha t-statistics is 6.31% per annum (t-statistic = 4.79).
Next, we construct two portfolios of hedge funds based on fund launch order. Portfolio
1 comprises the first funds launched by each hedge fund firm while portfolio 2 comprises
the follow-on funds launched by each hedge fund firm. We find that after controlling for
co-variation with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven factors, the loading on HFCHRONO or
the return spread between first and follow-on hedge fund portfolios for the FoF decile spread
is 0.56 (t-statistic = 2.08). This implies that skilled FoFs, i.e., those with high past alpha
t-statistics, tend to load up more on first funds versus follow-on funds than do unskilled
FoFs, i.e., those with low past alpha t-statistics. Moreover, the first versus follow-on hedge
fund spread explains 1.09% of the 6.31% per annum spread between the top and bottom
deciles of FoFs sorted on past two-year alpha t-statistics. These results, which are reported
in Table A2 of the Internet Appendix, suggest that relative to their unskilled competitors,
skilled investors may be cognizant of the impact of fund chronology on fund performance,
and judiciously overweight the first funds launched by hedge fund firms.
3.9 Endogeneity
Does the endogeneity of a firm’s growth strategy engender the underperformance of follow-on
versus first funds? Systematic di↵erences may exist between firms that conceive follow-on
funds (multiple-product firms) and those that do not (single-product firms). These dif-
ferences could impact both the propensity to launch follow-on funds and the performance
spread between first and follow-on funds. The multivariate regression methodology that we
employ in Section 3.2 allows us to ameliorate concerns that observed di↵erences between
funds managed by single- and multiple-product firms explain our results.
Still, the multivariate regressions leave open the possibility that unobserved di↵erences
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between funds managed by single- and multiple-product firms might simultaneously a↵ect
the decision to embark on a multiple-product growth strategy and the first versus follow-on
fund performance spread. To address this concern, we conduct an instrumental variables
analysis. The instrument that we use, i.e., firm strategy flow at founding, is motivated by
Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist’s (2015) choice of venture capital supply at founding to
instrument for firm listing status. Firm strategy flow at founding is the strategy flow of the
first fund conceived by the firm in the one-year period prior to firm inception.24 We argue
that the ability to attract capital at inception allows a first fund to grow quickly and sets
the stage for the launch of follow-on funds later (a firm takes about 38 months on average
to launch the second fund, another 28 months to launch the third fund, etc). The first-stage
results in column one of Table A3 in the Internet Appendix confirm this prediction. The
supply of capital around the time of firm founding is a negative and significant predictor of
a firm’s single-product status, proxied by FIRST, with an F -statistic of 20.52.25
The exclusion restriction is that conditional on covariates, firm strategy flow in the one-
year period before inception only a↵ects fund investment performance through its impact on
fund launch chronology status. One concern is that early firm strategy flow may drive future
strategy returns via strategy-level capacity constraints (Naik, Ramadorai, and Stro¨mqvist,
2007). In unreported results, we find that higher prior year strategy flow is not a reliable
harbinger of lower future strategy returns. Therefore, our use of strategy flow as opposed to
AUM allows us to sidestep concerns related to strategy-level capacity constraints.
In columns two and three of Table A3, we report the second stage results for the fund
return and alpha equations, respectively. After instrumenting for first fund status or FIRST
with firm strategy flow at inception, first funds continue to outperform follow-on funds. The
24Specifically, Asker, Farre-Mensa, and Ljungqvist (2015) use as their instrument the total number of firms
receiving first-round venture capital funding in a firm’s headquarter state two years after a firm was funded.
We use firm strategy flow in the one-year period before firm inception as an instrument since we seek to
explain fund launch chronology status for all periods post firm inception. We obtain similar inferences when
we use firm strategy flow during the two-year period before inception.
25For single-fund firms, FIRST is always equal to one. For multiple-fund firms, the probability that FIRST
equals to one in any month is a decreasing function of the number of follow-on funds launched by the firm
that report returns that month.
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results reported in columns four to six of Table A3 indicate that the more general fund launch
chronology results are also robust to adjusting for endogeneity. The supply of capital around
the time of firm founding is a positive and significant predictor of fund launch chronology
or CHRONO with an F -statistic of 133.71. After instrumenting for fund launch chronology
with firm strategy flow at inception, the later funds launched by firms still underperform the
earlier funds launched by firms.
4. Robustness tests
In this section, we present a medley of robustness tests to ascertain the strength of our
empirical results.
4.1 Backfill bias
First funds may backfill their returns more than do follow-on funds. In response to concerns
about backfill bias raised by Bhardwaj, Gorton, and Rouwenhorst (2014) and others, we
confine the analysis to TASS and HFR funds for which we have the date that the fund listed
on the databases (only TASS and HFR provide this information). Next, we redo the baseline
Table 3 portfolio sort for this subset of funds and for those returns at or after the respective
fund listing date. As shown in Panel A of Table 10, our results are robust to controlling for
backfill bias in this fashion. Inferences also remain unchanged when, as an alternative, we
remove the first 24 months of returns for all funds to adjust for backfill and incubation bias.
[Insert Table 10 here]
4.2 Serial correlation
Serial correlation in fund returns could arise from linear interpolation of prices for in-
frequently traded securities, the use of smoothed broker dealer quotes, or deliberate
performance-smoothing behavior. This could inflate some of the test statistics that we
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use to make inferences. To allay such concerns, we unsmooth fund returns using the al-
gorithm of Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) and redo the Table 3 portfolio sort. The
results reported in Panel B of Table 10 indicate that our findings are not driven by serial
correlation.
4.3 Pre-fee returns
Hedge fund returns are reported net of fees. If first funds charge lower fees than do follow-on
funds, this may explain the outperformance of the former. To check, we back out pre-fee
fund returns. As shown in Panel C of Table 10, the baseline portfolio sort spreads are even
greater when we analyze pre-fee fund returns.
4.4 Dynamic risk exposures
One concern is that the beta loadings of the fund portfolios might not stay constant over
time. As a result, the risk-adjustment for the baseline portfolio sort might not be accurate.
To account for dynamic factor loadings, we calculate the factor loadings using a rolling
36-month window and use those factor loadings to calculate abnormal returns one month
forward. The results, presented in Panel D of Table 10, indicate that our findings are robust
to catering for dynamic risk exposures.
4.5 Additional risk factors
The presence of additional risk factors could cloud the portfolio sort analyses. Relative to
follow-on funds, first funds could be loading up more on some risk factor (e.g., emerging
markets) that did well over the sample period. Hence, we augment the Fung and Hsieh
(2004) model with an emerging markets factor derived from the MSCI Emerging Markets
Index return and redo the Table 3 portfolio sort. To cater for hedge fund exposure to option
based strategies (Mitchell and Pulvino, 2001), we also augment the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
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model with out-of-the-money (henceforth OTM) S&P 500 call and put option-based factors
from the Agarwal and Naik (2004) model. Finally, to account for hedge fund exposure to
liquidity risk (Aragon and Strahan, 2012; Sadka, 2012), we augment the Fung and Hsieh
model with the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The results presented in
Panels E to G of Table 10 indicate that our baseline findings are not driven by the presence
of omitted risk factors.26
4.6 Fund termination
There are concerns that because funds that drop out from the database could have terminated
their operations, the portfolio alphas are biased upward. Edelman, Fung, and Hsieh (2013)
find that returns of funds after they dropped out of the databases do not di↵er materially
from returns of funds that remain in the databases. Nonetheless, to allay such concerns,
we assume that, for the month after a fund drops out of the database, its return is –10%.
Thereafter, money is reallocated to the remaining funds in the portfolio. As shown in Panel
H of Table 10, with that adjustment for fund termination, the alphas of the portfolios in
our Table 3 sorts fall but the spread remains economically and statistically significant. We
also experiment with more extreme termination returns of –20% and –30%, and obtain
qualitatively similar results.
4.7 Subsample analysis
To understand how the outperformance of first funds varies over time, we split the sample
period into two sub-periods: January 1994 to December 2003 and January 2004 to December
2013. Next, we redo the Table 3 portfolio sort for each sub-period. The results in Panels I
and J of Table 10 indicate that our findings are stronger in the first sub-period than in the
second sub-period. Nonetheless, the alpha of the spread between portfolios A and D is still
26Inferences do not change when we augment the Fung and Hsieh model with the emerging markets factor,
the OTM call and put option-based factors, and the Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor, and use
the resultant 11-factor model to adjust for risk exposure in our portfolio sorts.
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economically and statistically significant at 2.85% per annum (t-statistic = 2.28).
5. Conclusion
The empirical results in this paper enrich our understanding of capital accumulation in
the hedge fund industry. We show that there exists spillover e↵ects from first to follow-on
funds launched by hedge fund firms. Stellar first fund performance allows hedge fund firms
to raise follow-on funds that charge higher fees, set more onerous redemption terms, and
attract more capital. The spillover e↵ects in turn lead hedge fund firms to focus more on
the performance of their first funds. Consequently, first funds outperform follow-on funds
after adjusting for risk. In line with an agency explanation, the performance spread between
first and follow-on funds is strongest for funds with poor incentive alignment, i.e., where the
managers do not co-invest alongside their limited partners. Also consistent with the agency
view, the strategy of leveraging on successful first fund performance to launch multiple follow-
on funds hurts investors but benefits fund managers. Multiple-product firms underperform
single-product firms while harvesting greater fee revenues. Investors respond to this growth
strategy by redeeming from first funds when follow-on funds underperform. Therefore, firms
cannot completely forsake quality when embarking on a multiple-product growth strategy
that emphasizes quantity. Moreover, skilled hedge fund investors appear cognizant of the
incentive di↵erences that first versus follow-on funds face. They judiciously load more on the
earlier funds launched than on the later funds launched by hedge fund firms. Ironically, while
growing the hedge fund franchise by launching multiple products hurts performance ex-post,
the prospect of generating substantial fee revenues through a multiple-product hedge fund
firm may well incentivize outperformance ex-ante.
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Fig 1: Cumulative abnormal return of funds sorted on fund inception date. Portfolios of hedge funds are constructed by sorting funds based on fund
inception date. Foreach hedgefund firm, the first fund is the first fund launched by the firm. The first fund portfoliois the equal-weighted returnof the first
funds across firms. The other portfolios are defined analogously. Cumulative abnormal return is the difference between a portfolio's excess return and its
factor loadingsmultiplied by risk factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Factor loadingsare estimated over the entire sample period.
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
Fig2: Average monthlyabnormal return andassetsunder management of first funds before andafter launch of the first follow-on fund by the
same firm.Monthlyabnormal return is the difference betweenaportfolio'sexcess return andits factor loadings multiplied by risk factorsfrom
the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Factor loadings are estimated over the entire sample period.For each hedge fund firm, the first
fund is the first fund launched by the firm. First fund abnormal returns andassets under management (AUM)are averagedacross firms.The
sample includes firms that launch atleast onefollow-on fund from January 1997 to December 2013.Month 0 denotes the inception month for
the first follow-on fund managed by the same firm. The abnormal return graph is represented by the solid line (y-axis on the left) while the
AUM graph is represented by the dashed line (y-axis on the right). The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.
Investment strategy Total funds Dead funds 1st funds 2nd-5th funds 6th-10th funds 11th-20th funds Return months
Commodity Trading Advisors 1,507 330 813 537 95 44 89,017
Emerging Markets 833 371 320 306 85 46 57,777
Event Driven 1,162 329 523 412 125 68 87,973
Global Macro 1,949 657 857 727 151 84 117,580
Long Only 222 149 62 72 20 18 17,510
Equity Long/Short 5,341 1,578 2,657 1,772 478 250 377,870
Market Neutral 440 96 184 160 46 35 27,780
Multi-Strategy 2,222 1,100 839 602 191 184 141,800
Relative Value 2,459 815 1,069 880 265 116 152,050
Sector 309 127 132 102 24 25 22,034
Short Bias 34 5 19 13 2 0 2,868
Others 350 76 191 124 27 8 18,277
Total 16,828 5,633 7,666 5,707 1,509 878 1,112,500
Commodity Trading Advisors 1,455 315 804 516 89 32 85,971
Emerging Markets 717 306 311 272 63 37 52,458
Event Driven 1,053 301 497 364 105 54 80,807
Global Macro 1,850 638 841 663 146 74 112,830
Long Only 193 130 63 65 20 15 16,065
Equity Long/Short 4,922 1,498 2,576 1,555 423 208 357,240
Market Neutral 389 86 177 141 37 21 24,939
Multi-Strategy 2,139 1,077 833 554 174 178 137,370
Relative Value 2,268 744 1,043 799 221 98 142,980
Sector 276 107 128 89 23 22 19,967
Short Bias 31 4 18 12 1 0 2,626
Others 314 63 188 102 21 3 16,780
Total 15,607 5,269 7,479 5,132 1,323 742 1,050,000
Panel B: Without duplicate share classes
Table 1
Summary statistics
The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. Fundsare grouped according to their primaryinvestment strategy. The list of strategies follows
Joenväärä,Kosowski,andTolonen (2017) andincludes Commodity Trading Advisors, Emerging Markets,Event Driven, Global Macro, Long Only,Equity
Long/Short, Market Neutral, Multi-Strategy, Relative Value, Sector, Short Bias, and Others.
Follow-on funds










Follow-on fund  
monthly flow
FIRSTALPHA 0.007 0.257** 0.618 1.121** 0.148*
(0.72) (2.84) (1.65) (2.92) (2.16)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.021* 0.342** 0.722 0.987 0.223*
(2.10) (3.27) (1.18) (1.86) (1.99)
FUNDALPHA 0.940**
(8.88)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.050 0.136 0.099 0.113 0.014
FIRSTALPHA 0.005 0.269* 1.268** 1.800** 0.198*
(0.39) (2.58) (3.07) (4.01) (2.39)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.019 0.371** 1.074 1.178 0.393*
(1.82) (3.11) (1.69) (1.92) (2.62)
FUNDALPHA 0.886**
(6.97)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.046 0.134 0.106 0.117 0.013
FIRSTALPHA 0.008 0.271* 1.322** 1.905** 0.263**
(0.56) (2.10) (2.88) (3.95) (3.23)
NFIRSTALPHA 0.025* 0.333* 1.348* 1.174 0.451*
(2.18) (2.61) (1.97) (1.78) (2.90)
FUNDALPHA 0.775**
(5.89)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-squared 0.043 0.130 0.106 0.114 0.011
Panel C: Regressions with alphas averaged over the last 36 months
Table 2
Regressions on follow-on fund attributes and flow
Regressions are estimated on the fees, redemption terms, and flows for follow-on funds managed by each hedge fund firm.For each firm, wedistinguish
between the first fund launched and other follow-on funds. In the fund attribute regressions, the independent variables include FIRSTALPHA and
NFIRSTALPHA, whereFIRSTALPHA is the alphaof the first fund within the same firmaveraged over the last x months prior to the launch of the follow-
on fund and NFIRSTALPHA is the alpha of the other follow-on funds within the same firm averaged over the last x months prior to the launch of the follow-
on fund.In the fund flow regressions, the independentvariables include FIRSTALPHA, NFIRSTALPHA, andFUNDALPHA, whereFUNDALPHA is own
fund alpha averaged over the last x months. Fund management fee and performance fee are in percentage, while fund redemption period and noticeperiod
are in business days. The regressions include controls for follow-on fund investment style and inception year fixed effects. The t-statistics, derived from
robust standard errors that are clustered at the fund level, are in parentheses. In Panels A, B, and C, the lookback period x equals 12, 24,and 36 months,
respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variables
Panel A: Regressions with alphas averaged over the last 12 months



















































Panel A: Full fund sample
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.28** 6.67 0.27** 0.15** 0.03 0.20** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.70
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th funds launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.49** 3.56 0.26** 0.14** 0.08* 0.25** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.61
Portfolio C (6th to 10th funds launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.84* 2.44 0.28** 0.13** 0.09* 0.28** -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.55
Portfolio D (11th to 20th funds launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.82 1.36 0.25** 0.14** 0.11* 0.34** -0.02 0.01** 0.00 0.48
Spread (A - B) 1.63** 5.01 1.79** 5.68 0.01 0.01 -0.05** -0.06** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.14
Spread (A - C) 2.04** 3.62 2.43** 4.39 -0.01 0.02 -0.06** -0.09** 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.07
Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.45** 4.29 0.02 0.01 -0.08* -0.15** 0.01** -0.01 0.00 0.07
Panel B: Funds with AUM ≥ US$20m
Portfolio A (1st funds) 6.27** 4.37 3.44** 4.12 0.27** 0.17** 0.04 0.21** -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.69
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th funds launched) 5.02** 3.39 2.13* 2.14 0.24 0.14** 0.08* 0.28** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.59
Portfolio C (6th to 10th funds launched) 4.31* 2.28 1.17 0.83 0.28 0.15** 0.09 0.30** -0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.45
Portfolio D (11th to 20th funds launched) 2.61 1.48 -0.63 -0.47 0.23 0.15** 0.15** 0.32** -0.02 0.02** 0.00 0.43
Spread (A - B) 1.24** 2.90 1.31** 3.23 0.02 0.03* -0.04* -0.08** 0.00 -0.01** -0.01 0.16
Spread (A - C) 1.96* 1.96 2.27* 2.40 -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.09* 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.05
Spread (A - D) 3.66** 3.82 4.07** 4.46 0.03 0.02 -0.11** -0.11** 0.00 -0.02** 0.00 0.06
Table 3
Sorts on fund inception date
Every month, hedge funds are sorted based on their launch date within each hedge fund firm. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004)
seven-factor model. The Fung andandHsieh (2004) factorsare S&P500 return minusrisk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshiresmallcap minuslarge cap return
(SCMLC), change in the constantmaturity yieldof the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the durationof the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in
the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriatelyadjusted forduration (BAAMTSY),bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS
(PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t-statistics are derived from White (1980) standard 
errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.Panel Areports results for the full sample of hedge funds while Panel B reports results
for funds with AUM ≥ US$20m. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha
FIRST 0.146** 0.157** 0.131** 0.140**
(10.22) (10.97) (7.33) (8.14)
CHRONO -0.011** -0.014** -0.021** -0.022**
(-13.98) (-16.51) (-3.49) (-4.90)
Log(SIZE) -0.037** -0.018** -0.043** -0.022** -0.039** -0.020** -0.043** -0.022**
(-8.78) (-4.25) (-3.94) (-2.65) (-9.20) (-4.62) (-3.97) (-2.69)
MGTFEE 0.033** 0.051** 0.037 0.054* 0.036** 0.057** 0.041 0.060**
(2.81) (4.16) (1.68) (2.51) (3.11) (4.66) (1.84) (2.77)
PERFFEE 0.009** 0.019** 0.008* 0.014** 0.008** 0.018** 0.007** 0.014**
(7.56) (14.53) (2.30) (5.99) (6.91) (13.81) (2.25) (5.97)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.90) (3.12) (3.47) (3.69) (2.87) (3.06) (3.47) (3.62)
AGE -0.131** -0.158** -0.192** -0.254** -0.137** -0.173** -0.194** -0.261**
(-8.31) (-9.87) (-4.30) (-5.56) (-8.67) (-10.69) (-4.35) (-5.70)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R-squared 0.028 0.012 0.088 0.051 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.052
Table 4
Regressions on hedge fund performance
OLSandFama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge fund monthly return or alpha. Alphais
estimated relativeto the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. FIRSTis an indicator variable that takes a valueof onewhen afund is the first fund launchedby afirm anda
value of zero otherwise. CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m. MGTFEE is fund management fee in
percentage. PERFFEEis fund performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption noticeperiod in months. AGE is fund age in decades. The regressions include controls
for fund investment style fixed effects and year fixed effects (for the OLSregressions). The t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLS regressions, they are derived from robust
standard errors that are clustered by fund, while for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from Newey and West (1987) standard errors with athree-month lag. The
sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variables
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth



















































Portfolio 1 (firms with one fund) 8.86** 6.44 6.24** 8.21 0.28** 0.16** 0.02 0.17** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.72
Portfolio 2 6.78** 4.81 4.05** 4.76 0.27** 0.15** 0.04 0.22** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.67
Portfolio 3 6.75** 5.24 4.52** 4.83 0.21** 0.12** 0.05 0.19** -0.01 0.01** 0.01* 0.53
Portfolio 4 5.56** 4.06 3.02** 3.60 0.25** 0.15** 0.04 0.22** 0.00 0.01** 0.01 0.65
Portfolio 5 (firms with many funds) 5.11** 3.61 2.47* 2.38 0.24** 0.12** 0.11** 0.23** -0.01 0.01** 0.01* 0.53
Spread (1 - 5) 3.74** 7.32 3.77** 7.96 0.04** 0.04** -0.09** -0.06** 0.00 -0.01* -0.01* 0.25
Portfolio 1 (firms with one fund) 8.97** 6.43 6.26** 8.29 0.28** 0.17** 0.03 0.17** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.73
Portfolio 2 7.13** 5.06 4.35** 5.22 0.27** 0.15** 0.04 0.22** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.68
Portfolio 3 7.12** 5.58 4.85** 5.41 0.22** 0.12** 0.05 0.19** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.55
Portfolio 4 6.09** 4.38 3.40** 4.13 0.27** 0.15** 0.05 0.22** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.68
Portfolio 5 (firms with many funds) 5.20** 3.66 2.44* 2.48 0.25** 0.13** 0.10** 0.24** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.58
Spread (1 - 5) 3.76** 8.27 3.81** 9.02 0.03** 0.03** -0.07** -0.07** 0.00 -0.01* -0.01 0.24
Portfolio I (firms with one strategy) 8.95** 6.46 6.31** 8.35 0.28** 0.16** 0.02 0.17** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.73
Portfolio II 6.22** 4.92 4.90** 4.38 0.14** 0.09** 0.08* 0.13* 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.34
Portfolio III 6.49** 4.43 4.02** 3.51 0.21** 0.13** 0.09* 0.28** -0.01 0.02** 0.01* 0.46
Portfolio IV 5.82** 4.09 3.14** 3.13 0.23** 0.12** 0.07* 0.23** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.54
Portfolio V (firms with uncorrelated strategies) 4.74** 3.96 2.61** 2.79 0.19** 0.07** 0.09** 0.21** -0.01 0.01** 0.01* 0.47
Spread (I - V) 4.21** 6.51 3.70** 7.18 0.09** 0.09** -0.07** -0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.46
Portfolio I (firms with one strategy) 9.06** 6.45 6.33** 8.42 0.29** 0.17** 0.03 0.18** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.74
Portfolio II 6.69** 5.42 5.21** 4.89 0.15** 0.10** 0.07 0.16** 0.00 0.02** 0.02** 0.37
Portfolio III 6.50** 4.56 4.00** 3.69 0.21** 0.12** 0.09* 0.28** -0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.49
Portfolio IV 6.13** 4.18 3.34** 3.35 0.25** 0.13** 0.07* 0.23** -0.01 0.01** 0.00 0.57
Portfolio V (firms with uncorrelated strategies) 5.02** 4.15 2.70** 3.05 0.20** 0.08** 0.09** 0.21** -0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.53
Spread (I - V) 4.04** 7.09 3.63** 8.14 0.08** 0.08** -0.07** -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.46
Panel C: Sort based on strategy correlation within firm. Firm returns constructed from value-weighting fund returns
Panel D: Sort based on strategy correlation within firm. Firm returns constructed from equal-weighting fund returns
Table 5
Sorts on number of funds launched and strategy correlation within firm
In Panels A and B, every month, hedge fund firms are sorted into five groups based on the number of funds previously launched by the firm. Portfolio 1
consists of firms which have only launched one fund. The rest of the firms are divided equally into the four remaining groups based on the number of funds
launched. Portfolio 5 consists of the firms with the largest number of funds launched. In Panels C and D,every month,hedge fund firms are sorted into five
groups based on the average pairwise correlation of the strategies of the funds launched by the firm. Portfolio I consists of firms that only engage in one
strategy. The rest of the firms are divided equally into the four remaining groups based on the average pairwise correlation of the strategies engaged by the firm. 
Portfolio Vconsistsof the firms with the most divergent strategies. Alphais estimated relativeto the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung and
and Hsieh (2004) factors are S&P 500 return minus risk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire small cap minus large cap return (SCMLC), change in the constant
maturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spreadof Moody's BAA bond over
10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS
(PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend following strategy. The t-statistics are derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from
January 1994 to December 2013. In Panels A and C, firm returns are constructed by value-weighting returns across all funds within the firm. In Panels B and D, 
firm returns are constructed by equal-weighting returns across all funds within the firm. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panel A: Sort based on number of funds. Firm returns constructed from value-weighting fund returns
Panel B: Sort based on number of funds. Firm returns constructed from equal-weighting fund returns
Independent variables Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha
NFUNDS -0.006** -0.009** -0.009* -0.011**
(-10.45) (-13.85) (-2.12) (-3.81)
STRATCORR 0.268** 0.267** 0.274** 0.244**
(4.85) (4.62) (3.21) (4.02)
FIRST 0.103** 0.096** 0.089** 0.083** 0.109** 0.120** 0.095** 0.104**
(6.93) (6.43) (5.33) (5.35) (6.75) (7.37) (4.73) (5.74)
Log(SIZE) -0.037** -0.017** -0.041** -0.02* -0.036** -0.017** -0.041** -0.020*
(-8.64) (-4.04) (-3.78) (-2.42) (-8.36) (-3.82) (-3.79) (-2.41)
MGTFEE 0.037** 0.057** 0.041 0.061** 0.033** 0.051** 0.038 0.054*
(3.15) (4.71) (1.85) (2.78) (2.82) (4.16) (1.69) (2.47)
PERFFEE 0.008** 0.017** 0.007* 0.014** 0.009** 0.019** 0.007* 0.014**
(6.67) (13.53) (2.15) (5.80) (7.37) (14.43) (2.20) (5.88)
NOTICE 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 0.002**
(2.73) (2.91) (3.29) (3.40) (2.78) (3.02) (3.30) (3.52)
AGE -0.130** -0.156** -0.181** -0.241** -0.126** -0.153** -0.187** -0.249**
(-8.26) (-9.83) (-4.13) (-5.43) (-8.09) (-9.65) (-4.11) (-5.39)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R-squared 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.053 0.028 0.012 0.089 0.051
Table 6
Regressions on hedge fund performance with firm variables
OLSandFama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance. The dependent variable is hedge
fund monthly return or alpha. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. NFUNDS is the number of
funds launchedby the firm. STRATCORRis the average pairwise correlation of the strategies that the fund's firmengages in. FIRST is an
indicator variable that takes avalueof onewhenafund is the first fund launchedby afirmandavalueof zerootherwise. SIZE is last month
fund assets under management in US$m. MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund performance fee in
percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months. AGE is fund age in decades. The regressions include controls forfund
investment style fixed effects and yearfixed effects (for the OLS regressions).The t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLSregressions,
they are derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund, while for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, they are derived from
Newey andWest (1987) standard errorswith athree-month lag. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013.* Significant at




Before After Difference (after - before)
t -statistic of 
difference
Panel A: First fund return
Fund return (pct / month) - treatment group 1.41 0.81 -0.60** -13.17
Fund return (pct / month) - control group 1.17 0.72 -0.45** -9.83
Difference in return (pct / month) 0.25 0.09 -0.16** -4.24
Panel B: First fund alpha
Fund alpha (pct / month) - treatment group 0.90 0.46 -0.45** -11.27
Fund alpha (pct / month) - control group 0.64 0.35 -0.29** -7.52
Difference in alpha (pct / month) 0.26 0.10 -0.16** -4.36
Panel C: First fund AUM
Fund AUM (US$m) - treatment group 140.31 245.93 105.62** 59.97
Fund AUM (US$m) - control group 137.90 217.31 79.41** 59.77
Difference in AUM (US$m) 2.41 28.61 26.21** 14.16
Table 7
Event study with differences-in-differences analysis
This table reports results from an event study analysis of first fund attributes around the launch of the first follow-on fund by the
same hedge fund firm. First funds are the first funds launched by each hedge fund firm. The fund attributes analyzed include fund
return, alpha, and AUM. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model. Event month is the month that
the first follow-on fund is launched. The period "before" is the 36-month period before the event month and the period "after" is the
36-month period after the event month. To be included in the analysis, a first fund must survive at least 24 months before and after
the event month. Funds in the control group are matched to funds in the treatment group based on fund return, alpha, or AUM in the
24-month pre-event period. For example, in the fund return analysis, funds in the control group are matched to funds in the treatment
group by minimizing the sum of the absolute differences in monthly fund return in the 24-month pre-event period. The t-statistics are
derived from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level;
** Significant at the 1% level.
Independent variables
FIRSTALPHA 0.136** 0.093** 0.107** 0.062* 0.057* 0.035 0.126** 0.107** 0.097** 0.076* 0.104** 0.095**
(3.73) (2.65) (3.83) (2.55) (2.56) (1.56) (3.33) (2.75) (3.36) (2.50) (3.92) (3.55)
log(NFIRSTSIZE) -0.119** -0.105** -0.080**
(-2.98) (-3.59) (-3.13)
NFIRSTMGTFEE 0.103 0.137 0.051
(0.88) (1.52) (0.63)
NFIRSTPERFFEE 0.035** 0.029** 0.012
(3.21) (3.74) (1.90)
NFIRSTNOTICE 0.003 0.002 0.002
(1.46) (1.66) (1.32)
log(FIRSTSIZE) -0.056 -0.065* -0.042
(-1.77) (-2.52) (-1.91)
FIRSTMGTFEE 0.003 0.031 0.027
(0.04) (0.45) (0.42)
FIRSTPERFFEE 0.011 0.003 -0.001
(1.17) (0.44) (-0.09)
FIRSTNOTICE 0.002 0.002 0.001
(1.01) (0.97) (0.76)
Strategy Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj R-squared 0.030 0.089 0.028 0.122 0.008 0.085 0.026 0.067 0.018 0.069 0.023 0.062
Table 8
Regressions on first follow-on and first fund returns
OLS regressions are estimated on the first follow-on fund and first fund performance just after the inception of the first follow-on fund. The dependent variables include first follow-on fund abnormal return (NFIRSTALPHA) and first 
fund abnormal return (FIRSTALPHA) averaged over the 12-month, 24-month, or 36-month period post follow-on fund inception. Fund abnormal returns are measured relative to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model.
FIRSTALPHA is first fund alpha averaged over the 12-month or 24-month period just prior to first follow-on fund inception. NFIRSTSIZE is follow-on fund assets undermanagement at inception inUS$m. NFIRSTMGTFEE is
follow-on fund management fee inpercentage.NFIRSTPERFFEE is follow-on fund performance fee inpercentage.NFIRSTNOTICE is follow-on fund redemption notification period inmonths. FIRSTSIZE is first fund assets under
management at first follow-on fund inception inUS$m. FIRSTMGTFEE is first fund management fee inpercentage. FIRSTPERFFEEis first fund performance fee inpercentage. FIRSTNOTICEis first fund redemption notification
period in months. The multivariate regressions include controls for fund investment style and follow-on fund inception year fixed effects. The t-statistics, derived from robust standard errors that are clustered by firm, are in
parentheses. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Dependent variables
NFIRSTALPHA FIRSTALPHA







Strategy Fixed Effects Yes






Strategy Fixed Effects Yes






Strategy Fixed Effects Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes
Adj R-squared 0.008
Panel C: Regressions with past 36-month alpha
Table 9
Regressions on first fund flow
Regressions are estimated on the flow of the first funds managedby each hedge fund firm. For each firm,we
distinguish between the first fund launched and other follow-on funds. The dependent variable is first fund
flow (FIRSTFLOW). The independent variables include FIRSTALPHA, and NFIRSTALPHA, where
FIRSTALPHA is first fund abnormal return averaged over the last x months, and NFIRSTALPHA is the
average abnormal return of the follow-on funds within the same firmaveraged over the last x months. The
regressions include controls for fund investment style and year fixed effects. The t-statistics, derived from
robust standard errors that are clustered by firm, are in parentheses. In panels A, B, and C, the lookback
period x equals 12, 24, and 36 months, respectively. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panel A: Regressions with past 12-month alpha
Panel B: Regressions with past 24-month alpha
Portfolio
Excess 
Return                      
(pct / year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha                                         




Return                      
(pct / year)
t -stat of 
excess 
return
Alpha                                         
(pct / year) t -stat of 
alpha
Panel A: Adjusted for backfill bias Panel F: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with out-of-the-money call and put option factors
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.30** 4.81 4.26** 5.32 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.14** 6.40
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 5.95** 4.09 3.05** 3.41 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.33** 3.31
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.09** 3.39 2.20* 2.01 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.77* 2.28
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 2.02 0.97 -1.62 -0.97 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.53 1.06
Spread (A - D) 5.28** 4.14 5.88** 4.49 Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.61** 4.16
Panel B: Adjusted for serial correlation Panel G: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.97** 5.25 4.99** 5.73 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 4.94** 6.24
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.37** 3.96 3.20** 3.03 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 3.08** 3.10
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.97** 3.29 2.51 1.95 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 2.31* 1.96
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.25** 2.60 1.50 0.97 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 1.38 1.00
Spread (A - D) 2.72** 2.84 3.49** 3.70 Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.56** 4.24
Panel C: Pre-fee returns Panel H: Adjusted for fund termination
Portfolio A (1st funds) 12.52** 8.87 9.79** 12.10 Portfolio A (1st funds) 6.86** 4.96 4.19** 5.32
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 10.32** 6.92 7.44** 7.50 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 5.15** 3.53 2.34* 2.40
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 9.48** 5.71 6.36** 5.41 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 4.78** 2.94 1.72 1.50
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 8.17** 4.55 4.77** 3.52 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 4.34* 2.45 0.99 0.75
Spread (A - D) 4.35** 5.28 5.01** 6.17 Spread (A - D) 2.51** 3.09 3.19** 4.00
Panel D: Adjusted for dynamic risk exposures using 36-month rolling betas Panel I: Sub-sample analysis (January 1994 - December 2003)
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.97** 5.00 5.01** 5.30 Portfolio A (1st funds) 8.88** 5.19 6.49** 7.77
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.32** 3.82 2.97** 2.67 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 7.11** 4.08 4.84** 4.59
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.91** 3.21 2.60 1.90 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 6.68** 3.36 4.22** 3.12
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.28* 2.62 1.76 1.14 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 4.94** 2.78 3.11* 2.37
Spread (A - D) 2.68** 2.99 3.24** 3.62 Spread (A - D) 3.93** 3.83 3.37** 3.76
Panel J: Sub-sample analysis (January 2004 - December 2013)
Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.99** 5.75 5.78** 8.86 Portfolio A (1st funds) 7.10** 3.24 3.85** 3.00
Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 6.35** 4.31 4.08** 4.96 Portfolio B (2nd to 5th fund launched) 5.59* 2.35 2.02 1.30
Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.94** 3.61 3.58** 3.77 Portfolio C (6th to 10th fund launched) 5.21* 1.98 1.40 0.77
Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.20** 2.91 2.54* 2.19 Portfolio D (11th to 20th fund launched) 5.45 1.76 0.99 0.44
Spread (A - D) 2.79** 3.41 3.23** 4.21 Spread (A - D) 1.65 1.30 2.85* 2.28
Table 10
Robustness tests
Every month,hedge funds are sortedbased on their launch date within each hedge fund firm.Alphais estimated relativeto the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung andandHsieh (2004) factorsare S&P 500 return minusrisk
free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshiresmallcap minuslargecap return (SCMLC), change in the constantmaturity yieldof the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the durationof the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change in the spread of Moody's
BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriatelyadjusted forduration (BAAMTSY),bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS (PTFSFX), and commoditiesPTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend followingstrategy. Panel A
reports results adjusted for backfill bias by removing the return observations before fund listing date. Panel B reports results after unsmoothing returns using the Getmansky, Lo,and Makarov(2004) algorithm. Panel C reports resultsafter
addingbackfees to form pre-fee returns. Panel Dreports resultsadjusted fordynamicrisk exposuresby usingarolling 36-monthwindow to calculate factor loadings. Panel Ereports results after augmenting the Fung andHsieh (2004) model
with the MSCI Emerging Market Index excess return. Panel F reports resultsafter augmentingthe Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Agarwal andNaik (2004) out-of-the-money calland put option factors.Panel Greports resultsafter
augmenting the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model with the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. Panel H adjusts for fund termination by assuming that a fund delivers a-10 percent return for the month after it stops reporting returns.
Panels I andJ report results for two sub-sample periods: January 1994 to December 2003 andJanuary 2004 to December 2013, respectively.The t-statistics are derivedfrom White(1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January
1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
Panel E: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model augmented with an emerging markets equity factor
Internet Appendix: Hedge Fund Franchises
Independent variables Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha Fund return Fund alpha
FIRST 0.040 0.018 0.107* 0.039 0.120** 0.114** 0.155** 0.123**
(0.77) (0.34) (2.07) (1.06) (3.50) (3.26) (3.25) (3.13)
Log(SIZE) -0.052** -0.024 -0.050* -0.021 -0.026** -0.002 -0.036* -0.012
(-3.70) (-1.64) (-2.45) (-1.46) (-2.69) (-0.11) (-2.08) (-0.96)
MGTFEE 0.074 0.110* 0.025 0.101* -0.004 -0.006 0.005 0.004
(1.40) (2.23) (0.38) (2.14) (-0.19) (-0.33) (0.11) (0.14)
PERFFEE 0.010* 0.019** 0.004 0.015** 0.013** 0.019** 0.004 0.007**
(1.98) (3.88) (0.72) (2.77) (6.61) (9.29) (1.75) (3.10)
NOTICE 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.003** 0.004** 0.004** 0.006** 0.006**
(5.07) (4.28) (3.25) (3.22) (5.80) (6.85) (5.34) (5.33)
AGE -0.151* -0.242** -0.160 -0.260** -0.053 -0.082* -0.143 -0.260**
(-2.51) (-4.05) (-1.94) (-5.02) (-1.38) (-2.14) (-1.91) (-4.07)
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Adj R-squared 0.025 0.009 0.028 0.017 0.034 0.024 0.038 0.032
Table A1
Regressions on hedge fund performance
OLSandFama-Macbeth (1973) regressions are estimated on the cross-section of hedge fund performance for funds stratified by personal capital. The dependent variable is hedge
fund monthly return or alpha. Alphais estimated relativeto the Fung andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. FIRST is an indicator variable that takes avalue of one whena fund is
the first fund launched by a firm and a value of zero otherwise. CHRONO is fund launch order within the firm. SIZE is last month fund assets under management in US$m.
MGTFEE is fund management fee in percentage. PERFFEE is fund performance fee in percentage. NOTICE is fund redemption notice period in months. AGE is fund age in
decades. The OLSregressions include controls for fund investment styleand yearfixed effects. The t-statistics are in parentheses. For the OLSregressions, theyare derivedfrom
robust standard errors that are clusteredby fund,while for the Fama-MacBeth regressions, theyare derivedfrom Newey and West (1987) standard errors with a three-month lag.
Columns one to four report coefficient estimates from regressions on funds with personal capital. Columns five to eight report coefficient estimates from regressions on funds
without personal capital. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
OLS Fama-MacBeth OLS Fama-MacBeth
Funds with personal capital Funds with no personal capital

























































Portfolio 1 (high past alpha t-statistics) 7.11** 4.73 4.55** 4.24 0.17** 0.10* 0.07 0.32** -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.47
Portfolio 2 5.27** 3.44 2.58* 2.23 0.19** 0.15** 0.11* 0.24** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.47
Portfolio 3 4.23* 2.37 1.00 0.74 0.23** 0.15** 0.15** 0.30** -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.46
Portfolio 4 3.21 1.69 -0.44 -0.33 0.27** 0.15** 0.15** 0.29** -0.02* 0.00 0.01 0.52
Portfolio 5 3.29 1.81 -0.18 -0.14 0.25** 0.13** 0.12** 0.30** -0.02** 0.00 0.00 0.52
Portfolio 6 2.59 1.48 -0.81 -0.65 0.25** 0.13** 0.13** 0.28** -0.02** 0.01 0.00 0.53
Portfolio 7 3.17 1.88 0.16 0.14 0.25** 0.11** 0.08* 0.24** -0.02* 0.01* 0.00 0.52
Portfolio 8 4.06* 2.32 1.31 1.01 0.25** 0.12** 0.04 0.22** -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.46
Portfolio 9 2.57 1.50 -0.09 -0.07 0.22** 0.12** 0.04 0.22** -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.42
Portfolio 10 (low past alpha t-statistics) 0.79 0.46 -1.77 -1.33 0.25** 0.12** 0.02 0.14** -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.44
Spread (Portfolio 1 - 10) 6.31** 4.59 6.31** 4.79 -0.09** -0.02 0.04 0.18* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.03
Portfolio 1 (high past alpha t-statistics) 7.11** 4.73 6.40** 5.68 0.17** 0.11* 0.01 0.26** -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.96** 0.54
Portfolio 2 5.27** 3.44 4.56** 4.18 0.19** 0.16** 0.05 0.17** -0.01 0.00 0.01* -1.03** 0.54
Portfolio 3 4.23* 2.37 3.98** 3.52 0.23** 0.16** 0.06 0.20** -0.01 0.00 0.01** -1.55** 0.58
Portfolio 4 3.21 1.69 3.05** 2.68 0.27** 0.16** 0.05 0.17** -0.01 0.00 0.01** -1.82** 0.67
Portfolio 5 3.29 1.81 2.87* 2.47 0.25** 0.15** 0.03 0.20** -0.02 0.00 0.01 -1.59** 0.64
Portfolio 6 2.59 1.48 2.23* 1.97 0.25** 0.14** 0.04 0.18** -0.02* 0.00 0.00 -1.58** 0.66
Portfolio 7 3.17 1.88 3.04** 2.92 0.25** 0.13** 0.00 0.15** -0.01 0.01* 0.00 -1.50** 0.65
Portfolio 8 4.06* 2.32 4.19** 3.64 0.25** 0.13** -0.05 0.12* -0.01 0.01 0.00 -1.50** 0.58
Portfolio 9 2.57 1.50 3.16** 2.87 0.22** 0.14** -0.06 0.11* -0.01 0.00 0.00 -1.69** 0.58
Portfolio 10 (low past alpha t-statistics) 0.79 0.46 1.17 1.05 0.26** 0.13** -0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -1.53** 0.57
Spread (Portfolio 1 - 10) 6.31** 4.59 5.22** 4.03 -0.09** -0.03 0.08 0.22* 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.56* 0.06
Table A2
Fund of hedge funds sorted on past fund alpha t-statistics
Every January 1st, fund of hedge funds (FoFs) are sorted based on their alpha t-statistics estimated over the last 24 months. Alpha is estimated relative to the Fung 
andHsieh (2004) seven-factor model. The Fung andandHsieh (2004) factorsare S&P500 return minusrisk free rate (SNPMRF), Wilshire smallcap minuslarge
cap return (SCMLC), change in the constantmaturity yield of the U.S. 10-year Treasury bond adjusted for the duration of the 10-year bond (BD10RET), change
in the spread of Moody's BAA bond over 10-year Treasury bond appropriately adjusted for duration (BAAMTSY), bond PTFS (PTFSBD), currency PTFS
(PTFSFX), and commodities PTFS (PTFSCOM), where PTFS is primitive trend followingstrategy. In Panel A,we evaluateperformance in the post formation
period with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model. In Panel B, we evaluate performance in the post formation period with the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
augmented with HFCHRONO, whichis the difference between the return on the portfolio of firsthedge funds and the return on the portfolio of follow-on hedge
funds. First hedge funds are the first funds launchedby each hedge fund firm.All other hedge funds are classified as follow-on funds. The t-statistics are derived
from White (1980) standard errors. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level. 
Panel A: Fung and Hsieh (2004) model
Panel B: Fung and Hsieh (2004) augmented with HFCHRONO factor
FIRST RETURN ALPHA CHRONO RETURN ALPHA





Log(SIZE) -0.067** -0.015 0.012 0.110** -0.045** -0.021**
(-7.80) (-1.20) (0.97) (3.46) (-9.54) (-4.55)
MGTFEE -0.005 0.075** 0.080** 0.332* 0.077** 0.083**
(-0.18) (4.19) (4.37) (1.96) (5.30) (5.76)
PERFFEE 0.015** 0.002 0.013** -0.123** 0.008** 0.019**
(5.88) (0.67) (4.13) (-8.77) (4.78) (11.29)
NOTICE 0.004** 0.000 0.000 -0.022** 0.002* 0.002**
(7.23) (0.00) (0.39) (-4.88) (2.29) (2.76)
AGE 0.743** -0.519** -0.541** -3.89** -0.229** -0.226**
(17.28) (-4.33) (-4.76) (-24.76) (-7.98) (-7.79)
STRATEGYFLOW -0.420** 8.01**
(-4.53) (11.54)
F -test: STRATEGYFLOW = 0 20.52** 133.17**
Strategy Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




This table reports results from 2SLS regressions that usean instrumentalvariable (IV)approach to examine whether the observeddifferences in hedge
fund performance between funds that differ in their chronological launch order within firms reflect unobserved differences that endogenously determine 
fund launch order.Our instrument forfund launch order exploits the cross sectional differences in hedge fund managers' ability to accumulate capital at
the time of founding. We define hedge fund management company founding strategy fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW) as strategy flow over the 12-
month period prior to fund management company inception. The strategy used in STRATEGYFLOW corresponds to the investment strategy of the first 
fund launched by the firm. Columns 1 shows the first stage probit model of first fund status on hedge fund management company foundingstrategy
fund flow (STRATEGYFLOW)andthe groupof control variablesused in Table 4. The dependent variable is the first fund dummy (FIRST). It takes a
valueof onewhenafund is the first fund launchedby afirm anda valueof zerootherwise. The independent variables include the natural logarithmof
hedge fund size (log(SIZE)) where SIZE is in USD million, management fee (MGTFEE), performance fee (PERFFEE), redemption notice period in
months (NOTICE), fund age in decades (AGE)as wellas dummy variables foryear andfund investment strategy. Following Wooldridge (2010), the
second stage is estimated by 2SLS usingas instruments the first-stagepredicted probability. Columns 2 and 3 show the second stage results, wherethe
dependent variables are RETURN and ALPHA. RETURN is hedge fund monthly net-of-fee return. ALPHA is Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor
monthly alpha. Column 4 shows the first stage OLSregression of fund chronology on hedge fund management company foundingstrategy fund flow
(STRATEGYFLOW) and the group of control variables used in Table 4. The dependent variable is CHRONO or fund launch order within the firm.
Columns5 and6 show the second stage results, wherethe dependent variables are RETURN andALPHA. The z-statistics, in parentheses, are derived
from robust standard errors that are clustered by fund. The R-squareds are omitted as the R-squared has no statistical meaning in the context of
2SLS/IV. The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2013. * Significant at the 5% level; ** Significant at the 1% level.
